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TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION:
COMMUNITY-WIDE OR
INTERNATIONAL? THE SAGA
CONTINUES
IRENE CALBOLI*
I. INTRODUCTION
While the exclusive rights of use of a trademark entitle an owner to
prevent third parties from using identical or similar marks in relation to
identical or similar products without his consent, these rights are
qualified by the principle of "exhaustion," also known as the "first-sale
rule."' According to this principle, "[t]he right of a producer to control
distribution of its trademarked products does not extend beyond the
first sale of the product," and "[r]esale by the first purchaser of the
original article under the producer's trademark is neither trademark
* Dr. Calboli is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Marquette University Law School and a
Research Fellow at Bologna University Law School. She has a J.D. and Ph.D. in Intellectual
Property Rights and Competition Law from the University of Bologna Law School and an
L.L.M from the London School of Economics and Political Science, Law Department,
University of London. Dr. Calboli would like to thank Dr. Vito M. Mangini, Bologna
University, and Dr. Spyros M. Maniatis, for their help in and contribution to the preparation
of this Article. Additional thanks to Dean Howard Eisenberg and Assistant Dean Shirley
Wiegand, Marquette University Law School, and the Marquette Intellectual Property Law
Review staff, especially Peter T. Holsen, Editor-in-Chief.
1. See generally Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel Imports Through
Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999); Roland Michael Beckmann, Die Reichweite
des Erschopfungsgrundsatzes nach neuem Markenrecht, 11 G.R.U.R. INT'L 836 (1998); Gallus
Joller, Zur territorialen Reichweite des Erschopfungsgrundsatzes irn Markenrecht, 10
G.R.U.R. INT'L 751 (1998); Gallus Joller, Markenrecht und freler WVarenverkehr, 4 G.R.U.R.
INT'L 309 (1998); Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 28 I.I.C. 623
(1997); Ulrich LIwenheim, Nationale und Internationale Ersch6pfung von Schutzrechten im
Wandel der Zeiten, 4 G.R.U.R. INT'L 307 (1996); Charles Worth, Free Trade Agreements and
the Exhaustion of Rights Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-
Riding: An Examination of the Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market
Imports, 1988 WORLD COMPETITION 75; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Territoriality of Trademark
Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48 (1970).
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infringement nor unfair competition., 2 These limits on the trademark
right to exclusivity are founded in the interests of free trade and the free
movement of goods. Such limits are justified by the concept that
trademarks must not be used as tools of distribution, marketing policy,
or as a means for market division, in a way that counters their function
as distinctive indicators of origin.3
From a legal standpoint, the definition of an exhaustion regime
depends upon the recognition of this principle by national trademark
laws and upon the determination of the geographical area over which
the principle is to apply.4 Traditionally, national practices have been
characterized by two distinct approaches: "national exhaustion" and
"international exhaustion.
''
Under national exhaustion, once the trademarked products are
placed on the market by the owner, or with his consent, the owner's
rights are considered exhausted only in the domestic territory. The
owner will still be free to oppose the importation of genuine goods
2. Sebastian Int'l v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1720, 1722 (9th Cir. 1995), quoted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 25:41 (2001). According to the Ninth Circuit,
"the premise of the first sale is that 'the consumer gets exactly what the consumer bargains
for, the genuine product of the particular producer."' MCCARTHY, supra, § 25:41 n.4
(quoting Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1075 (2001)).
3. Even though trademarks perform a variety of functions in modern society, their
primary function, from a legal standpoint, is still as indicators of commercial origin. See
generally W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 612 (4th ed. 1996); Spyros M.
Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in ADRAIN STERLING,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & MARKET FREEDOM 65 (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1997);
Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection
Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406 (1993); Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics
of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988); Sidney A. Diamond, The Hlistorical
Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975); Frank I. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927) (stating that the
"proper function of a trademark" is "to identify the origin or ownership of goods to which it is
affixed"). This is reflected in most modern trademark legislation and has been affirmed in the
wording of Directive 89/105/EEC (recital 10' to the Directive states that "the function [of a
trademark) is in particular to guarantee the trademark as an indicator of origin") and in the
European Court of Justice's case law. See Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R.
1-6191 and Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1999
R.P.C. 117.
4. See S. K. Verma, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade-Article
6 of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 I.I.C. 534, 539 (1998).
5. On the differences between national and international exhaustion, see generally
Jesper Rasmussen, The Principle of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights Pursuant to Directive
89/104 (and Regulation 40/94), 4 E.I.P.R. 174 (1995); Herman Cohen Jehoram, International
Exhaustion versus Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law, 4 G.R.U.R.
INT'L 280 (1996).
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bearing his trademark that have been put on the market outside the
domestic territory.6 In contrast, under international exhaustion, if a
trademark owner, or someone with his consent, places the trademarked
goods on the market in any of the national jurisdictions where the
trademark owner enjoys protection, the owner's rights are exhausted in
other national jurisdictions where he enjoys similar rights. Accordingly,
the trademark owner will not be free to prevent international
importation of genuine products bearing his trademark.7
Because of its impact on the control of economic distribution, issues
regarding trademark exhaustion have been at the center of discussion in
Europe since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome. In the formative
years of the European Economic Community (EEC), the European
Community Commission (the "Commission") and the European Court
of Justice (ECI) argued that the exclusive rights afforded by national
laws to trademark owners could be an obstacle to the creation of a
unified internal market. This resulted in the development of the
doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion,' a regional compromise
between national and international exhaustion.
According to the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion, once a
product has been put on the market in a particular Member State, by or
with the consent of the legitimate trademark owner, the owner can no
longer rely on his national rights to prevent the importation of the
product from that State into another Member State.
6. Verma, supra note 4, at 539. On the difference between importation of genuine
goods and of materially different products, see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 29:46, :48 to .50,
:51.2.
7. Verma, supra note 4, at 539.
8. On the development of the principle of Community-wide exhaustion, see generally,
Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising Intellectual Property Law Within the European
Community, 23 LI.C. 622 (1992); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial Property and the Free
Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21 LI.C. 131 (1990); Vito M. Mangini,
Competition and Monopoly in Trademark Law: An EEC Perspective, 11 I.I.C. 591 (1980);
Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Doctrine of Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law--Scope and
Limits, 10 LLC. 20 (1979); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Trademark Conflicts in the Common Market
Can They be Solved by Means of Distinguishing Additions?, 9 I.I.C. 221 (1978); Ulrich
L6wenheim, Trademark and European Community Law, 9 I.I.C. 422 (1978); Lord Mackenzie
Stuart, The Function of Trade Marks and the Free Movement of Goods in the European
Economic Community, 7 I.I.C. 27 (1976); Willem Mak, Trademarks and te European
Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975). The ECJ developed the principle of Community-wide
exhaustion independently of the exhaustion regimes adopted by European Member States at
the national level. The laws of some countries, such as Germany, the Benelux Countries,
Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, generally accepted the principle of "international
exhaustion," while other European jurisdictions, such as France, Italy, and Spain, opted for
the principle of "national exhaustion."
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To approximate the laws of Member States relating to trademarks,
the Community-wide exhaustion criterion was eventually incorporated
into Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of December
21, 1988 (the "Trademark Directive").9 The adoption of the Agreement
for the European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2, 1992 extended this
principle to the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries
joining the EEA (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein)."0
However, it is unclear from the wording of the Trademark Directive
whether the principle of Community-wide (now EEA-wide) exhaustion
only represents a minimum standard that leaves Member States free to
apply more generous rules (i.e., international exhaustion), or whether
Community-wide exhaustion should be applied as the general criterion
to all intra-EEA trade. To settle this ambiguity, the ECJ interpreted
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive in two recent cases: Silhouette
International Schimed v. Hartauer Handelsgesellschaft" in 1998 and
Sebago Inc. et. al. v. GB-Unic SA12 in 1999. The ECJ ruled that the
Trademark Directive precludes national rules that provide for
international exhaustion of trademark rights. 3  Nevertheless, after
considering the strong pressures coming from some Member States in
favor of international exhaustion, the ECJ suggested that a possible
remedy could be "to extend the exhaustion provided for by Article 7 to
products put on the market in non-member countries by entering into
international agreements in that sphere, as was done in the context of
9. Council Directive 89/104/EEC was adopted by the European Council on December,
21 1988 after almost ten years of debate. The first draft of the Directive was published in
December 1980. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1980 O.J. (C 351/1). An attempted "final
proposal" was submitted to the Council in December of 1985. Council Directive 89/104/EEC,
1985 O.J. (C 215/4). Following the comments of several Member States, a new text was
drafted in October 1986 and discussed by the Working Group. In December 1987 an
amended text, strongly influenced by the Dutch delegation, was published and subsequently
approved by the Council in June of 1988. Following the advice of the Economic and Social
Committee in October of 1988 and the Opinion of the European Parliament in December of
1988, the Council adopted the Trademark Directive on December 21, 1988. Council
Directive 89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40/1). For a detailed analysis of the Commission's
working documents with special attention to the drafting of Article 7, see Cohen Jehoram,
supra note 1, at 501.
10. Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of the Protocol to the Agreement for the European
Economic Area (O.J.E.C. L 1/3, January 3, 1994) extended the effect of Article 7 of the
Trademark Directive to the EEA from January 1, 1994.
11. Case C-355/96, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, available at http:/curia.eu.int/jurisp (last visited
May 3,2002).
12. Case C-173/98, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999).
13. Id
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the EEA Agreement."1 As has been noticed, such compromise could
come under the scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement as a violation of the principle of "Most Favored Nation
Treatment," as per Article 4 of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)."5
The debate on the issue was reignited by the 1999 High Court of
London decisions in Zino Davidoff S.A. v. AG Imports Ltd. 16 and Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd.17 These cases introduced elements of
the law of contracts and the sale of goods, and private international law
into the debate. Despite pressure from some Member States, in its
November 2001 judgment in Zino Davidoff, the ECJ has continued to
prevent any change towards international exhaustion."
The issue of trademark exhaustion has also been the subject of
discussion within European institutions and among private trade
organizations. In April 1999, the Commission organized two meetings
with interested parties in order to discuss possible changes to the current
regime. As a result of these consultations, the Commission concluded
that a shift towards international exhaustion would not, at least in short
term, lead to a significant reduction in prices for consumers and decided
that such a change was not appropriate for the time being." In March
2001, however, the European Parliament took an opposite approach and
published a draft report on the issue, advocating the transition to
14. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.Rt at 30.
15. See Verma, supra note 4, at 557; Stanislaw Soltysinsky, International Exhaustion of
Intellectual Property Rights Under the TRIPS, the EC Law and die Europe Agreements, 4
G.R.U.R1 INT'L 316 (1996). Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement states that "with regard to the
protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members." GAIT Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994, art. 6. The concern that negotiation of
reciprocity agreements for the purpose of trademark exhaustion can come under the scope of
the WTO Agreement has also been recently expressed by the Commission. See generally
Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights: Working Document from the Commission Services,
available at httpl/europa.eu.int/commdgl5/intproplindprop/exhaust.htm (December 9. 1999)
[hereinafter Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion].
16. 30 I.I.C. 567 (1999) [hereinafter Zino Davidoflj].
17. Unreported.
18. Joined Cases C-414-416199, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd, Levi Strauss
& Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd. (Nov. 20,
2001), available at http:/curia.eu.intjurisp [hereinafter Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss
(Joined Cases C-414-416/99)].
19. For a summary of these meetings, see Commission Working Paper on Trademark
Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17-19. Further updates on the issue are available at the
Commission's web site at http"/europaeu'int/commfinternaLmarket/en/indprop.
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international exhaustion.2' Thus far, no relevant legislative measures
have been adopted and the debate on the issue is still open.2'
Following the recent ECJ case law, and in light of the overall debate
on the issue, this Study analyzes whether, and under what conditions, a
shift towards a regime of international exhaustion in Europe could still
be possible. This Study focuses on an analysis of trademark exhaustion
within the meaning of the Trademark Directive. It does not elaborate
on other issues, such as competition or questions on vertical restraints
that are also relevant in the larger context of parallel trade.2 First, this
Study will offer a description of the development of the doctrine of
Community-wide exhaustion and of the relevant rulings of the ECJ
before the adoption of the Trademark Directive. Next, this Study will
focus on the interpretive problems of Article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive that have characterized the provision so far, and will analyze
the ECJ rulings in Silhouette' and Sebago.? Finally, it will refer to the
recent consultations organized by the Commission and the European
Parliament, and to the ECJ ruling in Zino Davidoffj and Levi Strauss,26
in order to draw conclusions as to the possibility of a change towards a
regime of international exhaustion.
20. This unreported text was drafted by delegation members from Member States in
favor of international exhaustion.
21. On October 3,2001, the European Parliament voted 473 to 22 (with 27 abstentions)
in favor of a resolution providing for the creation of another Commission working paper
about the exhaustion of trademark rights. A provisional edition of the minutes of the
Parliament's resolution (SEC(1999)2033 - C5-0354/2000 - 2187/2000(COS)) is available at the
Community Parliament's web site (through a search in the Legislative Observatory using the
Rapporteur's name: Mayer Hans-Peter) at http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil (last visited May
22,2002).
22. From the ECJ's judgment in Case C-306/96, Javico Int'l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint
Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1983, it is clear that an export prohibition from a third
country may, under certain circumstances, be acceptable under European Union competition
rules. See Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 1. For a
position in favor of international trademark exhaustion because of its effects on free trade
and world-wide competition, see Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International
Exhaustion in the European Union in the Light of "Zino Davidoff". Contract Versus Trade
Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123, 140 (2000); W. R. Cornish, Trade Marks: Portcullis for the EEA?,
[1998] E.I.P.R. 174, 176.
23. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at 539.
24. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. at 1317.
25. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 567 (1999).
26. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), supra note 18.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
COMMUNITY-WIDE EXHAUSTION
So far, the position adopted by the Community regarding the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights has been different from other
jurisdictions. Clearly inspired by economic liberalization, but mainly at
the Community level, the main goal was to integrate national markets
and to create a unified European internal market27' During the years
that followed the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission and
the ECJ argued that the exclusive powers afforded by national law to
the holder of an intellectual property right could not be considered
"indispensable for its protection." Therefore, they argued against
absolute territorial protection to prevent the hindrance of parallel
importation within the Community. To this end, the ECJ initially
prohibited the exclusive use of intellectual property rights by application
of the rules of competition set by the European Community Treaty (EC
Treaty).' Since the early 1970s, the ECJ relied more frequently on the
principle of the free movement of goods, as settled in Articles 28 and 30
of the EC Treaty, in order to achieve the most awaited market
integration2
27. Verma, supra note 4, at 546; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 5, at 282.
28. The ECJ applied the EC antitrust provisions in the leading case Costen &
Grunding v. EC Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299. Article 81 (ex. Article 85) of the EC Treaty
states that "[t]he following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market."
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (0340) (Final)
(1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. Article 82 (ex. Article 86) provides: "Any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part
of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect
trade between Member States." Id at art. 82. According to both provisions, anti-competitive
behavior can consist, in particular, in
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d)
making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id
29. For a detailed reconstruction of the ECJ's case law, see Guy Tritton, Articles 30 to
36 and Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudence of the ECI now of an Ideal Standard?, 10
E.I.P.R. 472 (1994).
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Article 28 of the EC Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on
importation between Member States, and other measures having an
"equivalent effect," in order to ensure the free movement of goods
within the European internal market?0 The ECJ has held repeatedly
that national intellectual property rights that were directed to prevent
acts of importation may amount to measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restriction.31 Accordingly, actions enforcing exclusive rights
should not be allowed to succeed unless the actions are justified by
Article 30 of the EC Treaty, which allows Member States to apply their
national laws when protecting intellectual property rights. 2
Furthermore, the ECJ has traditionally overruled national laws
governing intellectual property rights when those laws would empower
trademark owners to prevent parallel importation within the
Community, and argued that the second part of Article 30 provides that
domestic laws should not provide a means of "arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction of trade between Member States.
33
These principles constitute the foundations of the doctrine of
Community-wide exhaustion and have been developed by the ECJ in
several leading cases.
A. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro Grossmarket
In Deutsche Grammophon,' the ECJ ruled for the first time that the
exercise, by the owner of an intellectual property right, of the right
30. Article 28 (ex. Article 30) of the EC Treaty states that "[q]uantitative restriction on
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member
States." EC TREATY art. 28.
31. Verma, supra note 4, at 546.
32. Article 30 of the EC Treaty provides that
[t]he provisions of Article 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
EC TREATY art. 30.
On the extent of this provision, see Bryan Harris, The Application of Article 36 to Intellectual
Property (a Review of the Case Law), 1 EUR. L. REv. 515 (1976).
33. Verma, supra note 4, at 546 (quoting EC TREATY art. 30). For further references
see also supra note 8.
34. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarket
GmbH, 1971 E.C.R. 487. The distinction between the "existence" and the "exercise" of
intellectual property rights arises from Costen & Grunding v. EC Commission, 1966 E.C.R.
299. For further analysis, see Georges Friden, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual
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enjoyed under the domestic law of a Member State to prohibit the sale
in that state of a product protected by that right and marketed in
another Member State by him or with his consent, was incompatible
with the EC Treaty rule on the free movement of goods in the common
market. The ECJ analyzed the scope of Article 30 of the EC Treaty in
order to overcome the argument that the provision allows restrictions on
the free movement of goods for the protection of "industrial and
commercial property."3S The ECJ drew a distinction between the
"existence" of the intellectual property rights and their "exercise."'
While the existence of the exclusive right is determined by respective
national laws, its exercise should be consistent with the EC Treaty.7
Accordingly, a restriction under Article 30 could only be justified to the
extent that it aims to safeguard the "specific subject matter" of the
intellectual property right at issue.
B. Centrafarm v. Winthrop
In relation to trademarks, the ECJ clarified the meaning of the
exclusive right's specific subject-matter in Centrafarm v. Winthrop."
According to the ECJ, trademark rights
guarantee that the owner of the mark has the exclusive right to
use the mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by
the trade mark into [the market] for the first time, and therefore
was intended to protect him against competitors wishing to take
advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by
selling products illegally bearing that trade mark?'
As a result, in the case *of parallel importation by independent
parties within the Community, the ECJ held that the invocation of the
right of exclusivity did not fall within the specific subject matter of
trademark rights, as long as the products in question were put into the
Property Law: The Distinction Between Existence and Exercise Revisited, 26 C.M.LR. 193
(1989).
35. Friden, supra note 34, at 193.
36. Id at 194.
37. Id
38. Case 16r74, Centrafarm BV v.Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183.
39. Id at 1194. The court confirmed its view in Case 3nl8, Centrafarm BV v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 1978 E.CR. 183 and Case 1181, Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1981
E.C.R. 2913. See Bryan Harris, The "Exhaustion Principle" and the Centrafarm Case, 4 EUR.
L. REV. 379 (1979).
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market of the Member State from which they were imported by the
trademark owner or with his consent.4°
C. Van Zuylen v. Hag
In the 1970s, the ECJ was at the height of its efforts to rid the
common market of intellectual property subdivision. In a 1973 case,
VanZulen v. Hag, also known as "Hag ,"' the ECJ developed the
doctrine of "common origin" as a complement to the doctrine of
Community-wide exhaustion. According to this principle, when marks
at issue were "sharing the same origin," it was incompatible with
Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty to prohibit the trading of the
trademarked product in a Member State that was lawfully registered in
another Member State because an identical trademark registration
already existed in the first state.' Hag I concerned two trademark
registrations in Belgium and Germany for the decaffeinated coffee
"Hag."4'3 Before World War II, both registrations were owned by the
same German company; but after the war, the Belgium registration was
confiscated by the Belgian government and eventually sold to a local
independent company, Van Zuylen Freres.Y According to the ECJ, in
spite of the facts that the two registrations were actually owned by
different companies and that Van Zuylen had the exclusive right on the
trademark in Belgium, their shared "origin" was sufficient to allow
importation into Belgium of German products bearing the trademark
,,Hag.,),45
The ECJ ruling in Hag I was heavily criticized. It was argued that
the ECJ had failed to address the essential function of a trademark, that
is, to indicate the origin of a product in order to prevent any likelihood
of confusion on the part of the public.4' Like the facts of Hag I, when
two identical trademark registrations are owned by different economic
40. On these aspects, see CORNISH, supra note 3, at 646; Eike Ullmann, Reconciling
Trade Mark Decisions of National Courts and the European Court of Justice, 27 I.I.C. 791
(1996); INGE GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
E.C. LAW 157 (1996); Ulrich L6wenheim, Intellectual Property Before the European Court of
Justice, 26 I.I.C. 829 (1995); Giuliano Marenco & Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and the
Community Rules on Free Movement Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1990).
41. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. For a detailed analysis of the criticisms expressed by the European legal doctrine,
see supra note 8. For a discussion on Trademark functions, see supra note 3.
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entities in different Member States, the ECJ could not use the free
movement of goods as a pretext to prevent the enforcement of the
legitimate owner's exclusive rights against the importation of similar
products bearing identical trademarks from another Member State.
This would be contrary to the "specific subject matter" of a trademark
as affirmed by the ECJ,4' and as a result would illegitimately deprive
trademark owners of their exclusive rights.
In light of these criticisms, two years later the ECJ drew back from
its ruling in Hag I with its decision in Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova
Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co.4' The ECJ held that Hag I's "common
origin" doctrine had been applied in a special case."'
D. CNL-Sucal v. Hag GF
In 1989, fifteen years after the decision in "Hag I," the ECJ reversed
itself in S.A. CNL-Sucal v. Hag Gf AG.- This case, known as "Hag II,"
had identical facts as Hag I. The ECJ confirmed that the essential
function of a trademark, the function of indicator of commercial origin,
would be compromised if trademark owners were not able to prevent
the importation of products bearing marks that are identical to, or likely
to be confused with, their own trademarks." Accordingly, and in spite
of their "common origins," two identical national registrations in
different Member States can legitimately prevent the importation of
trademarked products from and to these Member States.
E. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v. Ideal-Standard
In 1994, the ECJ confirmed this line of reasoning in IHT
Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH.n Hag I and
Hag II addressed the situation in which a trademark right had originally
been in common ownership and then had been divided "involuntarily"
through confiscation, without the original owner's consent. IHT
concerned a voluntary assignment of the trademark "Ideal Standard" to
one member of the IHT group, without the consent of the other.3
47. Van Zuylen Freres, 1974 E.CR. 731.
48. Case 119/75,1976 E.C.R. 1039.
49. Id. at 1062.
50. Case C-10/89,1990 E.C.t 1-3711.
51. Warwick A. Rothnie, Hag IL- Putbg the Common Origin Doctrine to Sleep, 1
E.I.P.R. 24 (1991); Rene Joliet & David T. Keeling, Trade Mark Law and the Free Movement
of Goods: The Overruling of the Judgement in Hag 1, 22 I.I.C. 303 (1991).
52. Case C-9/93,1994 E.C.R. 1-2782.
53. Id. at 1-2782 to 783.
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According to the ECJ, such an assignment did not exhaust the
trademark rights of the whole group.- In particular, the ECJ held that
the principle of exhaustion only applied
where the owner of the trade mark in the importing state and the
owner of the mark in the exporting State [were] the same
[economic entity], or where, even if they [were] separate
individuals, they [were] economically linked... [for example], as
licensee, parent company, subsidiary or exclusive distributor.
Conversely, exhaustion did not apply where trademark rights had
been assigned to an unrelated enterprise, no longer under the control of
the assignor or any related enterprises.56 In the ECJ's view, in the
absence of express or implied consent, the necessary grounds to invoke
trademark exhaustion could only be found in commercial "unitary
control."'  It could not be possible to validly invoke the exhaustion of
the exclusive rights of the legitimate trademark owner in the absence of
consent or unitary control.'
F. Analysis
According to the ECJ's rulings, the primary purpose of trademark
protection, as interpreted from Article 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty, is to
indicate commercial origin.59 The "Affaire Hag" served as an example
of how to understand the ECJ's progression in its appreciation of the
fundamental objectives of intellectual property and how it found a
compromise between the interest of intangible property protection and
the dictates of the free movement of goods. Accordingly, when goods
have no common origin but instead have been manufactured and
marketed independently, it is always possible to invoke trademark rights
to prevent the importation of products bearing identical or similar
trademarks that might create consumer confusion. Thus, for national
laws to be limited by Article 28 there must typically be a consensual act
by the exporting Member State to cause an exhaustion of rights in the
importing Member State, and thus free parallel imports. 6°
54. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Tritton, supra note 29, at 423.
55. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-2789 to 792.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191; Case C-39/97, Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1999 R.P.C. 117.
60. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 650.
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While affirming the legitimacy of parallel importation of genuine
goods within the European internal market, the ECJ did not exclude the
possibility for trademark owners to invoke exclusive rights where the
products at issue were "materially different."6  In this respect,
repackaging and relabeling with different marks raised interesting
issues.' In many Member States, to sell or distribute trademarked
goods that have been re-packed, re-marked, or otherwise interfered
with was, and still is, considered trademark infringement because the
marks no longer accurately indicate that the goods came unaltered from
the originating enterprise. After the adoption of the Trademark
Directive, while acknowledging that the matter poses a peculiarly
provocative constraint on the free movement of goods, the ECJ held
that repackaging and relabeling are two of the "legitimate reasons"
trademark owners may invoke to prevent parallel trade within the
EEA.0 According to the ECJ, to trade non-genuine or repackaged
products constitutes trademark infringement when it may lead to
confusion on the part of the public or provoke unfair detriment to the
trademark itself."
61. See Case 102f77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgeselschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R.1139, 1164-65. Regarding the differences
between "genuine" and "non-genuine goods," see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:51.2,
and the legal literature and case law cited.
62. The ECI did not make a clear distinction between the packaging and the product,
since "product requirement" also incorporates rules as to the packaging of the product. See
Joined Cases C-267 & C-268/91, France v. Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097,1-6131.
With respect to pharmaceutical products, the ECI confirmed its approach in Joined Cases C-
427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3457, 1-3536 to
3545, and most recently, in Cases C-379/97, Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999
E.C.R. 1-6927. See generally Karen Dyekjaer Hansen & Christian Karhula Lauridsen,
Rebranding of Parallel Imported Pharmaceuticals: The Pharmacia & Upjohn Case,
TRADEMARK WORLD, Dec. 19991Jan. 2000, at 16; David Rosemberg & Marleen Van
Kerckhove, Upjon v. Paranova: Utterly Exhausted by a Trip too Far, 1999 E.I.P.RI 223. On
the "relationship between the specific subject-matter of a trademark and the necessity of
repackaging," see also the April 23, 2002 decisions of the ECJ in Joined Case C-443199,
Merck, Sharp & Dohme GmbH v. Paranova Pharmazeutika Handels GmbH and Case C-
143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma KG v. Swingward Ltd., and others, available at
httpJcuria.eu.int/en/urisprindex.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).
63. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 137-139; see generally Ansgar Ohly,
Trade Marks and Parallel Importation - Recent Developments in European Law, 30 I.C. 512
(1999); Paul Torremans, New Repackaging Under de Trade Mark Directive of Well-
Established Exhaustion Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997).
64. For a case concerning these aspects, see Case C-349195, Loendersloot v. Ballantine
& Son Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. 1-6227 and Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV,
1997 E.C.Rt 1-6013. For comments, see generally Gert-Jan Van De Kamp, Protection of Trade
Marks: The New Regime - Beyond Origin?, 1998 E.I.P.R. 364; Helen Norman, Perume,
Whisky and Leaping Cats of Prey: A U.K Perspective on Three Recent Trade Mark Cases
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III. DEBATE ON ARTICLE 7(1) OF THE EUROPEAN TRADEMARK
DIRECTIVE: IS COMMUNITY-WIDE EXHAUSTION A MINIMUM
STANDARD OR THE GENERAL CRITERION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?
Article 7(1) of the European Trademark Directive has been a
controversial provision ever since it was in the drafting process. The
text was substantially altered during the drafting process.65 The final
text of the provision codifies the exhaustion doctrine as established by
historical ECJ and confirms the principle of Community-wide
exhaustion for all Member States (EEA-wide exhaustion since the EEA
Agreement entered into force in 1994).' Article 7(1) states that "the
trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation
to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent."67  However,
according to Article 7(2), this principle does not apply where "there
exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further
commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the
goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.""
The legitimate owner could not be expected to tolerate "further
commercialization" of the branded products when it affects the essential
Before the European Court of Justice, 1998 E.I.P.R. 306 (1998); Paul Walsh et al., Parallel
Imports: Labelling and Advertising Trademarked Products, TRADEMARK WORLD, Feb. 1998,
at 20. In Frits Loendersloot the Court affirmed that
Article 36 of the EC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that the owner of
trademark rights may, even if that constitutes a barrier to intra-Community trade,
rely on those rights to prevent a third party from removing and then re-affixing or
replacing labels bearing the mark which the owner has himself affixed to products he
has put on the Community market, unless: ... it is established that the use of the
trademark rights by the owner to oppose the marketing of the relabeled products
under that trademark would contribute to artificial partitioning of the markets
between Member States; ... it is shown that the relabelling cannot affect the original
condition of the product;... the presentation of the relabeled product is not such as
to be liable to damage the reputation of the trademark and its owner; and ... the
person who relabels the products' informs the trademark owner of the relabelling
before the relabeled products are put on sale.
Id. at 52.
For critical comments on the dangers of extending trademark protection against
infringements that do not contain elements of confusion, see Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra
note 22, at 139-140.
65. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 124.
66. See supra note 10.
67. Council Directive 89/104, art. 7(1), 1989 O.J. (L 040) 3.
68. Id. at art. 7(2).
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function of the mark by taking unfair advantage or causing illegitimate
detriment to the trademark's reputation.9
While Article 7(1) is rather clear about exhaustion at the
Community level, the provision is not clear about international
exhaustion. ° After the introduction of the Trademark Directive, the
question remains whether the principle of international exhaustion can
be preserved in the trademark law of the Member States that originally
recognized this principle, such as Germany, Austria, England, and the
Netherlands.7
1
There is no doubt that the exhaustion provision of the Trademark
Directive and the CTM Regulation in the Commission's original
69. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1996 E.C.Rt at 1-3457, Frits Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. at
1-6227, and Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.t at 1-6013, the Court introduced new elements into the
doctrine of exhaustion, making room for the protection of reputation and goodwill as an
exception to the exhaustion rule even where its essential function, i.e., indicator of origin, is
not endangered. See also Van De Kamp, supra note 64, at 369.
70. Council Directive 89/104, art. 7(1), 1989 OJ. (L 040) 3.
71. Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Mark Directive Allow International Exhaustion
of Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995). The German delegation, for example, argued that,
even after the adoption of the Trademark Directive, the national principle of international
exhaustion could be maintained and would not be affected by Article 7(1) of the Directive.
This position was strongly supported by many German authors, in particular by Professor F.
K. Beier, the director of the Max-Planck Institute in Munich. See Beier, supra note 8, at 156-
160. In Gefarbte Jeans, 1996 G.R.U.R. 271 (December 14, 1995) (I ZR 210/93), the German
Federal Court held, however, that international exhaustion no longer applied in German
trademark law. For a critical analysis of this case, see Florian Albert & Christopher Heath,
Dyed But Not Exhausted - Parallel Imports and Trade Marks in Germany, 28 I.I.C. 24 (1997).
The argument that Article 7(1) only represents a minimum standard was strongly supported
also by the Swedish Government in its argument in Silhouette. 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, 11 21 and
28-29. Arguing that the Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 95 (ex. Article 100A) of
the EC Treaty, the Swedish Government argued, according to Advocate General Jacobs in
his opinion, that "it is not part of the function of a trade mark to enable the owner to divide
up the market and to exploit price differentials. The adoption of international exhaustion
would bring substantial advantages to consumers, and would promote price competition." Id.
at opinion 48. According to Article 95:
4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation
measure, a Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on
grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the
environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these
provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them.
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council
or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it
necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating
to the protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a
problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the
harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the envisaged provisions
as well as the grounds for introducing them.
EC TREATY, art 95.
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proposal was intended to apply to those imports from outside the
Community as much as to those within." The original text of the 81h
recital of the Trademark Directive stated that "it is not, in principle,
possible to prohibit its use by a third party in respect of goods
marketed... within or outside the [European] Community under the
trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent...., 73 Because of the
"intense pressure from [the Community] and international industry, the
draft... was changed... confining [it] to goods first marketed with
consent 'in the Community.' 74 While the 8'h recital was first amended to
take into account that the Commission's decision to not require Member
States to introduce the principle of international exhaustion into their
national laws, the European Council (the "Council") completely
changed its previous text in the final version of the Trademark
Directive. 7' The reason given was that "an approach based solely on
principles of trademark law would lead to undesirable commercial
consequences. In so far as third countries do not acknowledge the
principle of international exhaustion, the Commission proposal would
result in discrimination of the industry in the Community."76
Based on these considerations, it seemed difficult to contend that the
Trademark Directive did not introduce the principle of Community-
wide exhaustion for all Member States, while leaving room for
72. Cornish, supra note 22, at 174; COM(80)635 final/2 at 1. For further analysis on the
preparatory works of the Trademark Directive and the CTM Regulation, see Cornish, supra
note 22, at 173-74. On the nature and extent of Article 7, Cornish asserted that the provision
is characterized as "by nature of derogation... in its original context-free from movement
within the market under Article 30 and 36-the provision has indeed only been necessary so
far as national trade mark law would otherwise impose a barrier to that movement." Id. at
175. The same has been asserted by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Silhouette:
Article 7(1) is a derogation from the rights conferred on the trade-mark owner by
Article 5(1). In general derogations should not be construed broadly. Here Article
7(1) cannot be construed more broadly than as providing for Community
exhaustion. It would be necessary to read into the Directive a further, implied
derogation leaving open the possibility of provision for international exhaustion,
which seems contrary to the structure of the Directive.
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion '1 34.
73. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 176 (quoting COM(80)635 final/2 at 1).
74. Cornish, supra note 22, at 174.
75. Id at 176.
76. Document 1-611/83, 1 August 1983, at 63. See also the Commentary to the
amended proposal published by the Commission in 1985 (COM(85) final at 13) where it was
affirmed that "in line with the proposal made by the Economic and Social Committee and
Parliament, the Commission decided not to introduce international exhaustion."
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conflicting or supplementary national rules.n Arguing that the
Trademark Directive expressly promotes only the partial harmonization
of national law,78 those who favor international exhaustion noted that by
restricting the ambit of Article 7 to EEA-wide exhaustion, the Council
did not intend to harmonize international exhaustion, but rather
intended to leave the Member States free to make or retain their own
provisions. They contended that, prior to implementation of the
Trademark Directive, Member States had discretion whether "to adopt
the principle of international exhaustion [and,] in absence of express
[direction] to the contrary, [whether this] should remain the position
under the [Trademark] Directive."' They also contended that on the
signing of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tarriffs
and Trade, the ECJ had confirmed its opinion' that Member States
retained competence, "in conjunction with the Community in matters of
international intellectual property."2 Accordingly, Member States
could be considered "free to negotiate or maintain arrangements with
other countries that allow mutual exhaustion of trade mark rights.
'
,1
Similarly, Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement had left open the
77. In Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6013, the ECJ stated that Article 7 of the Directive
must be "interpreted in the light of the rules of the [EC] Treaty [about] the free movement of
goods, and in particular Article 36." Id at 1 37. It also emphasized that the "provision is
intended to reconcile the... protection of [trademarks] with the... free movement of goods
within the [internal] market." Id at 42.
78. The 3 rd recital of the Trademark Directive states that "it does not appear to be
necessary at present to undertake full-scale approximation of the trademark laws of the
Member States and it will be sufficient if approximation is limited to those national provisions
of law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal market." Council Directive
89/104/EEC, 1988 OJ. (L 40/1) For a discussion concerning the extent of harmonization of
the Trademark Directive, see also Advocate General Jacobs Opinion in Silhouette, 1998
E.T.M.R. 539, 4-7.
79. Shea, supra note 71, at 463. Among those who favor international exhaustion, see
Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 176-78; Beier, supra note 8, at 156-60. According to these
authors, the intention of Article 7 was to codify the court's existing case law. They argued
that the ECJ had stressed that the provision should to be interpreted in the same way as the
court's case law on Article 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty. However, in the leading case, Case
270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R 329, the ECJ held that
Articles 14(2) and 23 of the Free Agreement of 1972 between the EEC and Portugal (not yet
a Member State), which were literal reproductions of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, did not
introduce the principle of exhaustion between Portugal and the Community.
80. Silhouette 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, 1 37.
81. Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994,1994 E.C.R. 1-5267.
82. Shea, supra note 71, at 464 n.15. ("Thus requiring each Member State individually
to ratify the TRIPS Agreement.").
83. Id at 464.
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possibility that any of the signatory countries could unilaterally adopt
international exhaustion.'
The opponents of international exhaustion heavily refuted these
arguments. They relied on the text of the 3'd recital of the Trademark
Directive and asserted that even though the Trademark Directive was
not about total harmonization, international exhaustion was one of the
provisions that the Trademark Directive sought to harmonize because it
"most directly affect[ed] the functioning of the internal market." 5 They
argued that diverging national provisions on international exhaustion
would necessarily result in a lack of harmonization in one of the most
important aspects of trademark rights.86  Allowing international
exhaustion at a national level would produce distortion in the smooth
running of intra-EEA trade and would provide unwelcome barriers to
the free movement of goods imported from third countries within the
EEAY Indeed, it would obviously contradict the spirit of the
Trademark Directive and the trend established by the ECJ in its
decisions concerning Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty if international
exhaustion were to only apply within the borders of States that
recognize this principle." On the contrary, if products put into the
market of the Member States that allow international exhaustion could
freely circulate throughout the EEA, international exhaustion would be
imposed in the whole Community, and non-exhaustion rules of other
countries would be defeated."
The opponents of international exhaustion found an additional
argument in support of their position in the interpretation of Article 13
84. See Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 508 (noting that Article 6 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that "for the purposes of dispute settlement [under this Agreement,
subject to the provisions of Articles 3 ["national treatment"] and 4 ["most favoured nation
treatment"]] nothing in [this Agreement] shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights"). This provision represents a compromise between two
opposite approaches: "[t]he US Proposal [to introduce its own national system,] national
exhaustion[,] and the [pleas of] developing countries.., for the opposite," international
exhaustion. Id at 508. Because of the lack of consensus on the issue, "[e]very country
[remained] free to adopt the exhaustion [regime it] want[ed]." Id. On the drafting of Article
6 of TRIPS, see id. at 506-508. For a critical analysis, see generally Soltysinsky, supra note 15,
at 317-20.
85. Shea, supra note 71, at 484. See also Annette Kur, Harmonization of the
Trademarks Laws in Europe -An Overview, 28 I.I.C. 16 (1997).
86. Shea, supra note 71, at 484. See generally Kur, supra note 85.
87. Ic.; Cornish, supra note 22, at 175.
88. Cornish, supra note 22, at 175; see also Shea, supra note 71, at 464.
89. Cornish, supra note 22, at 175; see also Shea, supra note 71, at 464.
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of the CTM Regulation.?° Like Article 7 of the Trademark Directive,
the final version of Article 13 of the CTM Regulation refers exclusively
to the exhaustion of trademark rights in relation to goods marketed
within the Community.9 However, the CTM Regulation was different
from the Trademark Directive because it did not intend to achieve
partial harmonization.' The CTM Regulation affected all Member
States and denied any discretion to opt for alternative rules, including
the international exhaustion regime.'
Therefore, the question remained whether the provisions of the
CTM Regulation and the Trademark Directive could be construed
differently, even though they had a common origin and identical text.
The opponents of international exhaustion stressed that, in order to
establish a consistent exhaustion regime applicable to all trademarks
within the European market, the provision of Article 13 of the CTM
Regulation supported the view that the Trademark Directive was
intended to preclude international exhaustion." In contrast, the
supporters of the principle of international exhaustion argued that the
objectives of the two instruments were different because the Trademark
Directive only aimed for limited harmonization."
Despite the fact that supporters of international exhaustion are not
unfounded in their arguments, the conclusion that Article 7(1) precludes
Member States from adopting international exhaustion, so that any
national provisions in this sense are contrary to European trademark
law, seems difficult to avoid.6 The wording and the purpose of the
Trademark Directive, its legislative history, the identical wording of the
(TM Regulation, and the undesirable effects of leaving matters to the
discretion of the Member States favor such a position. On the other
90. Council Regulation EC40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade
Mark, art. 13,1994 O1. (L 011) [hereinafter CrM Regulation].
91. Article 13(1) of the CTM Regulation states that "[a] Community trade mark shall
not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the
market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent."Id.
92. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion 1l 59-61.
93. CTM Regulation, supra note 90 1 61. The purpose of the CTM Regulation is to
create a unitary right enforceable throughout the whole Community. I& 56. Accordingly,
Article 14(1) of the CTM Regulation requires the effects of the right to be governed solely by
its own provisions, stating that "the effects of Community trademarks shall be governed
solely by the provisions of this Regulation." Id., art. 14. See also Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at
Opinion l 55-63.
94. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion 1H 61-62.
95. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464.
96. See Joller, supra note 1, at 309; George Pucher, Der zeitliche Anwendungsbereich
der nur EWR-weiten Erschdpfung ira Markenrecht, 4 W.R.P. 362 (1998).
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hand, differences in the interpretation of the issue at the national level
represent a barrier to consistent enforcement practices throughout the
Community.9 Several national courts have repeatedly tried to force an
interpretation of the Trademark Directive towards the direct or indirect
acceptance of international exhaustion. So far, the adoption of the
Trademark Directive does not appear to have profoundly changed the
way many national courts evaluate the issue, which is necessary in order
to ensure a consistent Community harmonization." It has been noticed
that "there is still scope for national courts ... to reach different views
on the same issue when applying [Community] intellectual property
law."' '
IV. VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-WIDE
EXHAUSTION AS CONFIRMED IN SILHOUETTE AND SEBAGO
In light of the previous discussion, it is not surprising that in the last
few years, national tribunals have repeatedly referred to the decisions of
the ECJ for guidance when interpreting Article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive.'0°  Because divergences in domestic laws predate the
Trademark Directive, it is not surprising that the question of
compatibility of international trademark exhaustion with Community
law is always raised in those countries that adopt international
exhaustion.'0 '
The ECJ's rulings represent the most highly qualified guidelines on
the interpretation of Community Law. However, from a legal
standpoint, they are not binding upon national courts. As for now,
domestic tribunals have shown a general willingness to follow the ECJ's
decisions. Because the ECJ's rulings do not technically represent the
"law of Europe," national decisions cannot be excluded in the future,
even after the conclusions reached by the ECJ in the following cases.
A. Silhouette
The need for interpretation of Article 7(1) was first expressed by the
Austrian Supreme Court when it was confronted with the re-
97. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464; Cornish, supra note 22, at 173-75.
98. For a summary of the different practices and attitudes in the interpretation of the
issue by national courts and legislators, see Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 502-506. Very
interesting in this respect is the study carried out by Abbe E. L. Brown, Post-Harmonisation
Europe-United, Divided or Unimportant? 2001 INTELL. PROP. Q. 275.
99. Brown, supra note 98, at 279.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION
importation from Bulgaria to Austria of sunglasses and spectacle frames
bearing the trademark "Silhouette."' m  The Austrian company,
Silhouette International Schmied (Silhouette International), sold 21,000
out-of-fashion sunglasses and spectacle frames to a Bulgarian company
at a discount price with the instruction to sell those products only in
Bulgaria or the states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and not to export them to other countries." "Nevertheless, the goods
found their way back to Austria where the discount chain Hartlauer
tried to sell them at... advantageous price[s].""lw Silhouette
International argued that the products at issue had been put into the
market in the EEA without its consent and therefore brought an action
for interim relief against Hartlauer.m Silhouette International claimed
that its trademark right was not exhausted, since that would only occur
when its products were put into the EEA market. '
Prior to the implementation of the Trademark Directive, Austrian
courts applied the principle of international exhaustion."m However, the
position subsequent to implementation was still unclear.' The
explanatory memorandum to the Austrian law that implemented Article
7 of the Trademark Directive indicated that the law was intended to
leave the question of whether the principle of international exhaustion
was valid to future judicial decisions.' The Austrian Supreme Court
decided to ask the ECJ whether national rules providing for exhaustion
of trademark rights with respect to products put into the market outside
the EEA by the trademark owner or with his consent are contrary to
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive."0 In other words, the question
to resolve was whether the principle of international exhaustion was still
applicable under Austrian law after the implementation of the
Trademark Directive."'
102. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 1 1-14.
103. Id. 8.
104. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 125.
105. Silhouette 1998 E.T.M.R. 1 10.
106. Id. The judicial proceedings at the national level are summarized in the ECJ's
decision. Id. 'I 10-14.
107. Id. 13.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 504.
110. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 15.
111. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 125. The questions asked by the
Austrian Supreme Court were:
(1) Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40,
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The answer given by the ECJ followed the approach adopted by the
Commission and the Council when they issued the Trademark
Directive.'12 On July 16, 1998, the ECJ clarified that "national rules
providing for exhaustion of trademark rights in respect of products put
on the market outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or
with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the Directive.""' While
confirming the principle of EEA-wide exhaustion, the Advocate
General emphasized that "international exhaustion is one of the...
[matters] which 'most directly affect the functioning of the internal
market' and...which the [Trademark] Directive ... [seeks] to
harmonize."...4  Accordingly, "if some Member States practice
international exhaustion while others do not, there will be trade barriers
within the internal market which it is precisely the object of the
[Trademark] Directive to remove.""' 5  In particular, the Advocate
General stressed that "the [Trademark] Directive cannot be interpreted
as leaving it open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law
for exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of
p.1) to be interpreted as meaning that the trademark entitles its proprietor to
prohibit a third party from using the mark for goods which have been put on the
market under that mark in a State which is not a Contracting State?
(2) May the proprietor of the trademark on the basis of Article 7(1) of the Trade
Marks Directive alone seek an order that the third party cease using the trademark
for goods which have been put on the market under that mark in a State which is not
a Contracting State?
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 1 14.
112 See il 27. For discussions of this case, see generally Alan W. White, Sunglasses:
A Benefit to Health? 1999 E.I.P.R. 176; Jochen Pagenberg, The Exhaustion Principle and
"Silhouette" Case, 30 I.I.C. 19 (1999); Andrew Clark, Parallel Imports: A New Job for
Customs?, 1999 E.I.P.R. 1; Thomas Hays, The Silhouette Case: The European Union Moves to
the Highest Common Denominator on the Gray Market Question, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 234
(1998); Thomas Hays & Peter Hansen, Silhouette is not the Proper Case Upon Which to
Decide the Parallel Importation Question, 1998 E.I.P.R. 277; Carl Steele, "Fortress Europe"
for Trademark Owners: The Spectacle of the ECJ Silhouette Judgment, TRADEMARK WORLD
Aug. 1998, at 14.
113. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 31. In its ruling, the court affirmed:
National rules providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in respect of products
put on the market outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with its
consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of
December 21, 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to
trademarks, as amended by the Agreement on the European Economic Area of
May 2, 1992.
Id. at Ruling 1 1.
114. Id. at Opinion 41.
115. Id.
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products put on the market in non-member countries... The ECJ
replied to the argument of the Swedish Government that the
[Trademark] Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 100(a) of the
Treaty "with the result that Article 7 is to be interpreted as meaning
that the [Trademark] Directive applies only to intra-Community
relations."117 The ECJ stated that "Article 7 is not intended to regulate
relations between Member States and non-member countries but to
define the rights of proprietors of trademarks in the Community...... In
the ECJ's view, "[t]his is the only interpretation which is fully capable of
ensuring that the purpose of the [Trademark] Directive is achieved,
namely to safeguard the functioning of the internal market.""t 9
Considering the strong pressure from some Member States, the ECJ
ultimately noted that "the Community authorities could always extend
the exhaustion provided for by Article 7 to products put on the market
in non-member countries by entering into international agreements in
that sphere, as was done in the context of the EEA Agreement. ' m
However, as noted earlier, this approach could come under the scope of
the WTO Agreement. 2' Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement does not
address exhaustion.m Despite this, establishing bilateral or multilateral
agreements with non-member countries for the purpose of trademark
exhaustion may ultimately represent a violation of the principle of
"Most Favored Nation" as per Article 4 of TRIPS."
116. ld. at Opinion 26.
117. Id. 28. For the full text of Article 95 (ex. Article 100A) of the EC Treaty, see
supra note 71.
118. dL 29.
119. Id. 1 27. Following the ECJ decision, the Austrian Supreme Court decided the
Silhouette case consistently with the ECI, and declared that Silhouette Internationale's rights
"were not exhausted by putting its spectacles bearing the trademark on the market in
Bulgaria; by re-importing these spectacles into Austria, the defendant has infringed Sec.
10a(1) of the Trademark Act." Id. See also Case No. 4 Ob 223/98, Decision of the Austrian
Supreme Court, 31 LI.C. 207,212 (2000).
120. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R 30.
121. See Verma, supra note 4, at 552-62; Heath, supra note 1, at 628-30; Soltysinsky,
supra note 15, at 316.
122. Verma, supra note 4, at 535.
123. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464 n.16; Verma, supra note 4, at 552-62. "A review of
TRIPS started in 2000 and it was believed that one issue which may be considercd was the
question of parallel import[ation] and [trademark] exhaustion." Brown, supra note 98, at 285.
However, "[tto date... there [are no new] developments in this regard." Id- The issue was
not stressed, as it was not even on the agenda, during the WVTO Conferencc in Doha, Quatar,
in November 2001. For further details see the WTO web site at httpJ/www.vto.org (last
visited May 2,2002).
2002]
70 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
B. Silhouette & Mag Instrument
In its judgment, the ECJ attempted to overrule a decision adopted
by the EFTA Court of Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, on the same
issue one year earlier in Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading
Company.1 ' Mag Instrument concerned the parallel importation of
flashlights from the United States into Norway.'2' The EFTA Court
argued that "the principle of international exhaustion is in the interest
of free trade and competition, and thus in the interest of consumers."'
' 6
The court stated that it was for the courts or legislators in EFTA States
to decide whether they wish to introduce or maintain the principle of
international exhaustion of trademark rights for products imported from
outside the EEA.V In order to draw a distinction between the position
of the EFTA countries and the Member States, the court stressed that,
"unlike the EC Treaty, the EEA Agreement does not establish a
customs union,"'12 but merely a free trade area, and that the EEA
Agreement does not entail a common commercial policy towards third
countries 9
124. 29 I.I.C. 316 (EFTA 1998).
125. Id.
126. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 505.
127. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion 30.
128. Id at Opinion 43.
129. See id; see also Mag Instrument, 29 I.I.C. at 316. According to the EFTA Court,
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion only applies to products "originating in the
EEA...." Id at 43. Indeed,
[tihe purpose and the scope of the EC Treaty and the EEA Agreement are different
(see Opinion 1/91 of the ECJ regarding the Draft Agreement between the
Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade
Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area
[1991] ECR 1-6079). Thus, the EEA Agreement does not establish a customs union,
but a free trade area. The above mentioned differences between the Community and
the EEA will have to be reflected in the application of the principle of exhaustion of
trademark rights. According to Article 8 EEA, the principle of free movement of
goods as laid down in Articles 11 to 13 EEA applies only to goods originating in the
EEA, while in the Community a product is in free circulation once it has been
lawfully placed on the market in a Member State. In general, the latter applies in the
context of the EEA only in respect of products originating in the EEA. In the case
at hand, the product was manufactured in the United States and imported into
Norway. Accordingly, it is not subject to the principle of the free movement of
goods within the EEA.
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion 43 (quoting Mag Instrument, 29 I.I.C. J1 25-26). For
an interesting comparison of the two decisions, Silhouette and Mag Instruments, see Anna
Carboni, Cases About Spectacles and Torches: Now, Can We See the Light? 1998 E.I.P.R. 470;
Joller, supra note 1, at 751-65; Kunz-Hallstein, Zur Frage der Parallelimporte im
Internationalen Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 1998 G.R.U.R. 268; Troller, The Parallel
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This decision encountered severe criticism. Even if there is no doubt
that international exhaustion can play an important role in increasing
competition, the approach suggested by the EFTA Court would result in
reinstating those barriers against the free movement of goods within the
EEA that the Trademark Directive attempts to eliminate by
harmonizing national laws.' Within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the
EC Treaty, the exclusive rights of trademark owners are equally
exhausted if products are put into the market in Norway, Iceland, and
Liechtenstein, or in any Member State of the Community. Consistency
between the ECJ and the EFTA Court is necessary in order to avoid
conflicting interpretations."
One year after Silhouette, the ECJ confirmed the principle of EEA-
wide exhaustion in Sebago.' Sebago, a United States corporation, and
Maison Dubois, Sebago's exclusive distributor in the Benelux,
contended that another company's importation into Belgium of shoes
marketed in El Salvador, bearing Sebago's trademark "Docksides,"
without their consent, constituted trademark infringement under
Benelux Trademark Law.w The trademark owners argued that their
rights had not been exhausted under Article 13A(8) of the Benelux
Uniform Trademark Law, which had implemented Article 7 of the
Trademark Directive, because the products in question were put into
the market outside the EEA and were brought into Belgium without
their consent.' In response, GB-Unic, the company that imported the
shoes, argued that "to satisfy the consent requirement in Article 13A(8)
of the... [Benelux Trademark Law, it was sufficient] that similar goods
bearing the same trade mark had already been lawfully marketed in the
Community with the consent of the trade mark proprietor."" In turn,
Sebago claimed that "consent must be obtained for each defined batch
of goods."'' GB-Unic also argued that Sebago had given implied
consent to the importation of the Docksides shoes into the EEA by
Importation of Trade-Marked Goods and the Protection of Selective Distribution Systems.
1998 E.LP.R. 67. Always interesting in this respect is Vanderburg, The Problem of
Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is not a Trademark Problem, 1959 T.M.R. 707.
130. See Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 505-506.
131. See id. Contrary to what is stated by the EFTA Court, it was also not so clear
whether the EEA countries could withdraw so easily from the EC intellectual property rules.
132. Sebago, 2 C.M.LR. 22.
133. Id, 5-8.
134. Id
135. Id. 1 10.
136. Id.
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failing to impose an export ban on its licensee in El Salvador."7
Accordingly, this failure should be interpreted as implied consent to
importation of the products at issue into the EEA.38
The Brussels Court of Appeal dismissed the latter argument because
GB-Unic could not prove that Sebago had effectively granted a license
to use the trademark in El Salvador.' As this Study will analyze, the
same argument was subsequently raised in the High Court cases Zino
Davidoff and Levi Strauss"4 in England. Instead, the Brussels Court of
Appeal deferred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the general
extent of Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive. 41 More specifically,
the Belgian Court asked whether consent could be considered implied
within the meaning of Article 7(1) when the trademark owner had
consented to the marketing of other individual batches of the products
in the EEA. a
137. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 11.
138. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 126 (summarizing the ECJ's decision);
see also Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. [[ 1-11 (stating the opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs).
139. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 30.
140. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).
141. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 10.
142. Id. 12. The Brussels Court of Appeal referred to the ECJ the following
questions:
Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks ... to be
interpreted as meaning that the right conferred by the trademark entitles its
proprietor to oppose the use of his trademark in relation to genuine goods which
have not been put on the market in the European Economic Community (extended
to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein by virtue of the Agreement of 2 May 1992
establishing the European Economic Area) by the proprietor or with his consent,
where:
- the goods bearing the trademark come directly from a country outside the
Community or the European Economic Area,
- the goods bearing the trademark come from a Member State of the Community or
of the European Economic Area in which they are in transit without the consent of
the proprietor of the trademark or his representative,
- if the goods were acquired in a Member State of the European Community or of
the European Economic Area in which they were put on sale for the first time
without the consent of the proprietor of the trademark or his representative,
- either where goods bearing the trademark - which are identical to the genuine
goods bearing the same trademark but are imported in parallel either directly or
indirectly from countries outside the European Community or the European
Economic Area - are, or have already been, marketed within the Community or the
European Economic Area by the proprietor of the trademark or with his consent,
- or where goods bearing the trademark - which are similar to the genuine goods
bearing the same trademark but imported in parallel either directly or indirectly
from countries outside the European Community or the European Economic Area -
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In its July 1, 1999 decision, the ECJ restated its previous ruling in
Silhouette and affirmed that "the rights conferred by the trademark are
exhausted only if the products have been put on the market in [the
EEA]. '' . Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive "does not leave it
open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for
exhaustion of the rights conferred by the trademark in respect of
products put on the market in non-member countries."' " The ECJ then
stated that:
protection would be devoid of substance if, for there to be
exhaustion within the meaning of Article 7, it were sufficient for
the trade-mark proprietor to have consented to the putting on
the market in that territory of goods which were identical or
similar to those in respect of which exhaustion is claimed.'"
Accordingly, the ECJ thought the answer to the second question
addressed by the Brussels Court of Appeal should be that "for there to
be consent within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the [D]irective, such
consent must relate to each individual item of the product in respect of
which exhaustion is pleaded."' " In support of its ruling, the ECJ stated
that its "interpretation is, moreover, confirmed by Article 7(2) of the
[Trademark] Directive which, in its reference to the 'further
commercialization' of goods, shows that the principle of exhaustion
concerns only specific goods which have first been put on the market
with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor. ' '
The arguments proposed by the defendant GB-Unic in Sebago'
looked innovative and interesting from a legal standpoint. However,
are, or have already been, marketed within the Community or the European
Economic Area by the proprietor of the trademark or with his consent.
Id 1 10.
143. Id 22. The same statement is reaffirmed in the ECJ's conclusions.
144. Id
145. Id 21.
146. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 22. The ECJ also affirmed that this is the interpretation of
Article 7(1) that the Court has already adopted. Thus, the Court has already held that the
purpose of that provision is to make possible the further marketing of an individual item of a
product bearing a trademark that has been put on the market with the consent of the trade-
mark proprietor and to prevent him from opposing such marketing (Case C-337/95 Parfismu
Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR 1-6013, paragraphs 37 and 38, and Case C-63197 BMW v
Deenik [1999] ECR 1-0000, paragraph 57). That interpretation is, moreover, confirmed by
Article 7(2) of the Directive which, in its reference to the 'further commercialisation' of
goods, shows that the principle of exhaustion concerns only specific goods which have first
been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor. Id. 1 20.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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they misinterpreted the exhaustion doctrine's rationale of preventing
abuses of trademark rights by limiting the control of the proprietor of
the trademark to the first sale of the products bearing his trademark.49
The principle of exhaustion, whether EEA-wide or international, should
apply to each individual product and not to types of goods or product
lines. As noted by Advocate General Jacobs in Sebago, if a limitation of
trademark rights through the adoption of the principle of international
exhaustion in the EEA "seem[s] desirable and would no doubt be
welcomed in many circles,"' it should be decided as a matter of
Community law.' As the Advocate General stressed:
[t]he [C]ourt cannot... be expected to stand legislation on its
head in order to achieve an objective, even were it to be
considered desirable. If the [Trademark] Directive is found to
have effects which are unacceptable, the correct remedy is to
amend the [Trademark] Directive or, as the court observed in...
Silhouette, to enter into international agreements in order to
extend the principle of exhaustion to products put on the market
in non-member countries, as was done in the EEA Agreement. 2
Once again, the latter approach may be construed as a violation of
Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly, a general consensus
for the amendment of the Trademark Directive could represent a more
adequate solution to the issue.
V. ZINO DAVIDOFF AND LEVI STRA USS:
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION VIA THE BACK DOOR?
In 1999, the High Court of Justice in London reexamined whether or
not consent could be implied under certain conditions, as per Article
149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
150. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 29.
151. Id The Advocate General pointed out that "[h]owever, as the Court observed in
Silhouette, no argument has been presented to the Court that the Directive could be
interpreted as imposing a rule of international exhaustion. The dispute centered only on
whether the Directive left the matter to the discretion of the Member States." Id
152. Id. 30. See generally Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501. The author stresses
how, during the drafting proceeding of the Trademark Directive, the Commission pointed out
that, even if it had decided to introduce the principle of Community-wide exhaustion,
the Community must, however, be empowered to conclude, at some future time,
with important trading partners, bilateral or multilateral agreements, whereby
international exhaustion is introduced by the contracting parties. The restriction to
Community-wide exhaustion, however, does not prevent the national courts from
extending this principle, in cases of a special nature, in particular where, even in the
absence of a formal agreement, reciprocity is guaranteed.
Commission Explanatory Memorandum, COM(84)470 final.
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7(1) of the Trademark Directive, in three cases that concerned the
parallel importation of genuine products from outside the EEA: Zino
Davidoff v. A & G Importsm Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores,"" and Levi
Strauss v. Costco Wholesale."5 These cases did not follow the position
adopted by the ECJ in Silhouette and Sebago, once again showing the
reluctance of some Member States to accept the principle of
Community-wide exhaustion in their domestic law. Nevertheless, these
cases introduced very interesting elements into the debate on the
exhaustion of trademark rights. They emphasized the question of the
role of national contract law, and because international contracts were
involved, the role of national rules on private international law in
relation to choice of law in contractual mattersY- These cases were
referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Following its previous
position, the ECJ reaffirmed the regime of Community-wide exhaustion
as the applicable rule within the EEA, and consistently analyzed the
issue of "consent" as per Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.'
A. Zino Davidoff v. Imports Limited
Zino Davidoff came before Mr. Justice Laddie in the High Court of
London as an application for summary judgment. m Davidoff SA, the
owner of the trademarks "Cool Water" and "Davidoff Cool Water,"
tried to prevent the importation of a batch of Davidoff toiletries to the
EEA by A&G Imports (A&G)." The batch in question had been
marketed in Singapore with Davidoff's consent." Even though it was
clear that the products were not marketed within the Community with
the explicit consent of the trademark owner, it was unclear whether
Davidoff's consent to the marketing of its products in Singapore
implicitly extended to their free circulation and sale around the world."'
153. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 567. For comments on this case see, Stamatoudi &
Torremans, supra note 22, at 129; Anna Carboni, Zino Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports
Limited. A Way Around Silhouette?, 1999 E.I.P.R. 524; Carl Steele, Silhouette Put in the
Shade: A Summary of the Recent Davidoff Case, 119 TRADEMARK WORLD 25 (1999); Robert
Swift, Davidoff: Scottish Court Declines to Follow English Rule on Parallel Imports, 2000
E.I.P.R. 376.
154. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).
155. Id.
156. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 129.
157. Id. at 130.
158. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 568.
159. Id.
160. Id. 1 3-4.
161. Id. 15.
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"Davidoff den[ied] that it had consented, or could be treated as having
consented" to further commercialization of the products in question.'6
In turn, A&G argued that there was consent and that the exact content
and implications of the consent were to be derived from the contract for
the sale of the goods."' Mr. Justice Laddie felt that, pursuant to the
relevant law of contract in this case, it was arguable that subsequent
purchasers of Davidoff's products were free to market the goods within
the EEA and that the plaintiffs were to be treated as having consented
to such marketing.1 " It was suggested that English law included a
rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of the imposition of a full
and explicit restriction on purchasers at the time of purchase, trademark
owners are to be treated as having consented to the importation and the
sale of the goods in the EEA."' In this case, full and explicit restriction
had not been imposed. Accordingly, on May 18, 1999, the High Court
declined to grant summary judgment because it did not consider the
defendant's arguments unfounded.'"
Because the case raised fundamental questions relating to the scope
and effect of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive, a reply to which
would be necessary for the determination of the issue at the full trial, the
High Court of London deferred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.' 67
The High Court asked whether the concept of consent, as per Article
7(1), could extend to implicit or indirect consent and not only to explicit
162 Id. L 20.
163. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 1 21.
164. 1d k 23.
165. 1l 28.
166. Id. 37 (arguing that "neither Silhouette nor Sebago throw any light on the issue
of how the proprietor can object effectively to such trade"). Justice Laddie further declared:
the rights of the third party can be determined by the law of the contract of supply to
that customer or the law of the non EEA country in which the sale to the third party
takes place. Where that law includes a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence
of full or explicit restrictions being imposed on purchasers at the time of purchase,
the proprietor is treated as consenting to the goods being imported into and sold in
the EEA, courts within the EEA are free to recognize the effect of that law and to
allow importation of the authorized external goods accordingly.
Id. 39. For further details, see Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-
416/99). In this context it should also be noticed that a very similar case was submitted to the
Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland (JOOPI GmbH v. M&S Toiletries Ltd and
Zino DavidoffSA v. M&S Toiletries Ltd., reported by Brown, supra note 98, at 279). While
the parallel importers argued that, because of insufficient marketing restrictions, there was
implied consent to re-importation into the EEA, the Scottish court found that the trademark
owner had taken all reasonable measures to ensure goods would be sold in particular
territories. Accordingly, no implied consent could be inferred. Id.
167. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 43.
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and direct consent.' 6' It also asked whether a national law, which
constitutes a general presumption that trademark owners have waived
their exclusive rights in the absence of a full and explicit restriction,
could be considered consistent within the Trademark Directive's
meaning.
169
168 Id. at 16-25.
169. Id. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patent
Court), requested the ECI to give a preliminary ruling on the following questions:
(1) Insofar as First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40, p.
1) refers to goods being put on the market in the Community with the consent of the
proprietor of a mark, is it to be interpreted as including consent given expressly or
implicitly and directly or indirectly?
(2) Where: (a) a proprietor has consented to or allowed goods to be placed in the
hands of a third party in circumstances where the latter's rights to further market the
goods are determined by the law of the contract of purchase under which that party
acquired the goods, and (b) the said law allows the vendor to impose restrictions on
the further marketing or use of the goods by the purchaser but also provides that,
absent the imposition by or on behalf of the proprietor of effective restrictions on
the purchaser's right to further market the goods, the third party acquires a right to
market the goods in any country, including the Community, then, if restrictions
effective according to that law to limit the third party's rights to market the goods
have not been imposed, is the Directive to be interpreted so as to treat the
proprietor as having consented to the right of the third party acquired thereby to
market the goods in the Community?
(3) If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is it for the national
courts to determine whether, in all the circumstances, effective restrictions were
imposed on the third party?
(4) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate
reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include
any actions by a third party which affect to a substantial extent the value, allure or
image of the trademark or the goods to which it is applied?
(5) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate
reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include
the removal or obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of any markings on
the goods where such removal or obliteration is not likely to cause any serious or
substantial damage to the reputation of the trademark or the goods bearing the
mark?
(6) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate
reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include
the removal or obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of batch code
numbers on the goods where such removal or obliteration results in the goods in
question (i) offending against any part of the criminal code of a Member State
(other than a part concerned with trademarks) or (ii) offending against the
provisions of Council Directive 761768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of
the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (OJ 1976 L 262, p. 169)?
Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-41699), j 16.
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B. Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores and Levi Strauss v. Costco Wholesale
The issue of how to interpret "consent" was raised again before Mr.
Justice Pumfrey in the High Court of London in Levi Strauss v. Tesco
Stores and Costco Wholesale!" Levi Strauss commenced proceedings
against Tesco Stores and Costco Wholesale, claiming trademark
infringement of its "Levi's" mark.17' Levi Strauss had refused, directly
or through its subsidiary in England, to sell Levi's 501 jeans to Tesco
and Costco.' m It had also refused to allow these companies to operate as
authorized distributors of the products in question 7  Tesco and Costco
accordingly obtained genuine top-quality Levi's 501 jeans from traders
who had imported such jeans from countries outside the EEA."' The
jeans sold by Tesco had been manufactured by, or on behalf of Levi
Strauss in the United States, Canada, or Mexico and were first sold in
those respective countries.175 The jeans sold by Costco had also been
manufactured in the United States or Mexico.176 The contracts pursuant
to which Tesco and Costco purchased these jeans contained no
restrictions as to the markets in which the goods could be sold.'"
Levi Strauss emphasized its selling policy for the above countries. In
the United States and Canada, Levi Strauss sells its products to
authorized retailers, who are obliged, under pain of having their
supplies cut off, to sell the jeans exclusively to end users.78 In Mexico,
Levi Strauss usually sells its goods to authorized wholesalers under the
condition that they will not be exported from Mexico. 79 In response,
Tesco and Costco argued that they had acquired an unrestricted right to
dispose of the jeans as they wish, because no express restriction was
expressly imposed by contract." °
It was against this background that in July, 1999, a few months after
Justice Laddie's decision in Zino Davidoff, the High Court decided to
defer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The questions asked by the
High Court were very similar to the ones asked previously in Zino
170. Id. at Opinion 1 1-2.
171. Id. 24.
172- Id. 21.
173. Id.
174. Zino DavidoffSA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), 1 22.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 125.
179. Zino DavidoffSA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), 25.
180. Id. 27.
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Davidoff."' The High Court focused on the need to clarify the concept
of consent, and in particular the concept of implied consent, pursuant to
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive. The High Court also
addressed the compatibility of Community law with the national
provision, according to which, trademark owners should be considered
as having waived their exclusive right worldwide in the absence of any
express reservation in the contract governing the sale of the goods."' In
addition, the High Court raised the question of whether a restriction of
the right to dispose freely of goods may be relied upon against a third
party transferee when it is imposed on the first purchaser by the first
vendor, or agreed between the two parties to the sale.O
181. Id. 128.
182. Id
183. Id. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patent
Court), referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:
(1) Where goods bearing a registered trademark have been placed on the market in
a non-EEA country by the trademark proprietor or with his consent and those
goods have been imported into or sold in the EEA by a third party, is the effect of
Directive 89/104/EEC (the Directive) that the trademark proprietor is entitled to
prohibit such importation or sale unless he has expressly and explicitly consented to
it, or may such consent be implied?
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is that consent may be implied, is consent to be
implied from the fact that the goods have been sold by the proprietor or on his
behalf without contractual restrictions prohibiting resale within the EEA binding
the first and all subsequent purchasers?
(3) Where goods bearing a registered trademark have been placed on the market in
a non-EEA country by the trademark proprietor
(a) to what extent is it relevant to or determinative of the issue whether or not there
was consent by the proprietor to the placing of those goods on the market within the
EEA, within the meaning of the Directive, that: (i) the person placing the goods on
the market (not being an authorized retailer) does so with the knowledge that he is
the lawful owner of the goods and the goods bear no indication that they may not be
placed on the market in the EEA; and/or (ii) the person placing the goods on the
market (not being an authorized retailer) does so with knowledge that the
trademark proprietor objects to those goods being placed on the market within the
EEA; and/or (iii) the person placing the goods on the market (not being an
authorized retailer) does so with the knowledge that the trademark proprietor
objects to them being placed on the market by anyone other than an authorized
retailer, and/or (iv) the goods have been purchased from authorized retailers in a
non-EEA country who have been informed by the proprietor that the proprietor
objects to the sale of the goods by them for the purposes of resale, but who have not
imposed upon purchasers from them any contractual restrictions on the manner in
which the goods may be disposed of; and/or (v) the goods have been purchased from
authorized wholesalers in a non-EEA country who have been informed by the
proprietor that the goods were to be sold to retailers in that non-EEA country and
were not to be sold for export, but who have not imposed upon purchasers from
them any contractual restrictions on the manner in which the goods may be disposed
of; and/or (vi) there has or has not been communication by the proprietor to all
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C. The ECJ's Decision
On November 20, 2001, the EC issued its decision.' Clearly aware
that the questions addressed by the High Court of London were
characterized by its criticisms of the exclusion of international
exhaustion of trademark rights pursuant to the Trademark Directive,''
the ECJ again confirmed the principle of EEA-wide exhaustion as the
general rule to be applied within the EEA.'u The EC focused its
attention on the interpretation of "consent," and pointed out that
consent, as per Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive, constitutes the
decisive factor to be considered when assessing the extinction of a
trademark owner's right to prevent third parties from importing goods
bearing his trademark into the EEA.'s' The interpretation of "consent"
is a matter of Community law and should be consistent throughout the
EEA.' Should the meaning of "consent" be a matter for national laws,
divergences in the threshold of trademark protection may develop and
eventually undermine the purpose of the Trademark Directive's
harmonization."9 In the absence of a legislative definition, the ECJ
opted to supply a uniform interpretation.'"
As a general rule, the EC stated that "[i]n view of its serious effect
in extinguishing the exclusive rights [of trademark owners] ... consent
must be so expressed that an intention to renounce those rights is
unequivocally demonstrated ... ",,'91 "Such intention will normally be
subsequent purchasers of its goods (i.e., those between the first purchaser from the
proprietor and the person placing the goods on the market in the EEA) of its
objection to the sale of the goods for the purposes of resale; and/or (vii) a
contractual restriction has or has not been imposed by the proprietor and made
legally binding upon the first purchaser prohibiting sale for the purposes of resale to
anyone other than the ultimate consumer?
(b) Does the issue of whether or not there was consent by the proprietor to the
placing of those goods on the market within the EEA, within the meaning of the
Directive, depend on some further or other factor or factors and, if so, which?
I '128.
184. See generally Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).
185. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 506-07.
186. Zino DavidoffSA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), I[ 30-34.
187. Id. 41 (stating that "[i]t therefore appears that consent, which is tantamount to
the proprietor's renunciation of his exclusive right under Article 5 of the Directive to prevent
all third parties from importing goods bearing his trademark, constitutes the decisive factor in
the extinction of that right").
188. Id. [ 42-43.
189. Id See also Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 133; Cornish, supra note
22, at 174-5.
190. Zino DavidoffSA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), [ 43.
191. Id 45.
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gathered from an express statement of consent."' '  Nevertheless, the
ECJ admitted that:
consent may, in some cases, be inferred from facts and
circumstances prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the
placing of the goods on the market outside the EEA which, in
the view of the national court, unequivocally demonstrate[s] that
the proprietor has renounced his rights [to oppose placing of the
goods on the market within the EEA]."'
However, contrary to the London High Court's opinion, the ECJ
concluded that consent cannot be inferred
from the fact that the proprietor of the trademark has not
communicated to all subsequent purchasers of the goods placed
on the market outside the EEA his opposition to marketing
within the EEA; from the fact that the goods carry no warning of
a prohibition of their being placed on the market within the
EEA; from the fact that the trademark proprietor has transferred
the ownership of the products bearing the trademark without
imposing any contractual reservations and that, according to the
law governing the contract, the property right transferred
includes, in the absence of such reservations, an unlimited right
of resale or, at the very least, a right to market the goods
subsequently within the EEA. 4
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive should accordingly be
interpreted as precluding national rules, such as the English law at issue
in these cases that constitute a general presumption of waiver or are
equivalent to such a presumption. Indeed, a "rule of national law, which
is merely based upon the silence of the trademark proprietor, does not
recogn[ize] implied consent, but rather deems consent to have the effect
of limiting the protection afforded to trademark owners.""
192. Id. 46.
193. 1d. 47.
194. Id. 60. Accordingly, the ECJ did not accept the argument stressed by Justice
Laddie: "There is nothing to support the suggestion that existing case law or Community law
creates a presumption that a proprietor shall be taken to object to unfettered distribution of
goods which have been sold on the 'open market outside the EEA unless he expressly
consents to such further distribution." Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 567, 1 37. See also Stamatoudi
& Torremans, supra note 22, at 133.
195. Zino DavidoffSA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), 11 58-59. In this
respect, Advocate General Stix-Hackl has affirmed in her Opinion (available on the ECJ's
web site http/curia.eu.int) that "it is for the national court... to determine whether, when
the products concerned were in fact first placed on the market, the trademark proprietor had
waived his exclusive right to control distribution within the EEA." Id. 1 99. On the other
hand, such determination should happen "in compliance with the [provisions] of Community
law and having regard to all the circumstances of the individual case." Id. 123.
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The ECJ expanded its ruling while replying to the last question
addressed by the High Court of London in the Levi Strauss cases. In
order to prevent further attempts to introduce international exhaustion
via the back door, the ECJ adopted an approach clearly in favor of
trademark owners. The ECJ concluded that
[s]ince... consent cannot be inferred from the proprietor's
silence, preservation of his exclusive right cannot depend on
there being an express prohibition of marketing within the EEA,
which the proprietor is not obliged to impose, nor, a fortiori, on a
repetition of that prohibition in one or more of the contracts
concluded in the distribution chain.
9 6
Accordingly, "national rules on the enforceability of sales
restrictions against third parties are not, therefore, relevant to the
resolution of a dispute between the proprietor of a trade mark and a
subsequent trader in the distribution chain concerning the preservation
or extinction of the rights conferred by the trade mark."'17 In particular,
the ECJ stressed that "it is not relevant [whether] the importer of goods
bearing the trade mark is aware that the proprietor objects to their
being placed on the market in the EEA or sold there by traders other
than authorized retailers."'98  It is equally irrelevant if authorized
"retailers and wholesalers have not imposed on their own purchasers
contractual reservations setting out such opposition, even though they
have been informed of it by the trade mark proprietors."'"
The ECJ did not restate the possibility of adopting a less protective
approach on the issue of consent in the future through the establishment
of bilateral or multi-lateral agreements with non-member countries, as it
had previously done in Silhouette and Sebago.' As noticed by the
Commission itself, such silence probably derives from the increasing
awareness that these agreements can be held illegal under the WTO
196. Zino DavidoffSA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), 64,
197. Id. 65.
198. Id 66.
199. Id This approach is in contrast with the position adopted by the ECJ, on the
same issue, in Case C-306/96, Javico International and Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent
Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1983. For criticism of these aspects, see Stamatoudi & Torremans,
supra note 22, at 139-41; Cornish, supra note 22, at 176. As noted before, this article does not
elaborate on the antitrust issue. However, it should be pointed out that the position adopted
by the ECJ in its decision can be in contrast with principles of Article 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
200. See generally Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99);
Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 129-33.
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system. m As a result, this decision will receive severe criticism because
it represents a victory for trademark owners, not for consumers or the
market. Because some Member States and national courts are reluctant
to accept the current exhaustion regime, there is also little doubt that
the debate will be reignited by some domestic tribunal in the near
future. 2 M
VI. POLITICAL DEBATE AND RECENT ATrEMPTS TO INTRODUCE
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
After the adoption of the Trademark Directive, European
institutions and trade organizations have also debated the proper
interpretation of Article 7(1). Similar to divergences encountered
within national courts, Member States and interested circles were
sharply divided. This became apparent during the discussion in hearings
and meetings among European institutions. Once again, the supporters
of international exhaustion claimed that the Community exhaustion
regime constitutes an important barrier to parallel trade and creates
high prices for consumer goods within the Union. Those advocating
Community exhaustion argued that this system is necessary for the
promotion of European investments in innovation and high-quality
goods.0
In 1999, the Commission launched a study on the possible economic
consequences of a change in the EEA-wide exhaustion regime.2) This
study, which was carried out by National Economic Research Associates
(NERA) in London and presented to the Commission in February
1999, confirmed that "[t]he main argument for maintaining the current
201. See Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 8.
202. See generally Brown, supra note 98 (providing an updated overview of European
domestic cases on parallel imports).
203. The arguments stressed during the discussions within European institutions are
well summarized on the Commission's web site at
http://europa.eu.int/commrmternaLmarketlen/indprop/0l-157.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).
204. Rhys et al., The Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the Area of Trademarks,
European Commission (1999), available at
http//europa.eu.int/comminternaLmarket/enindprop/tmstudy.htm.
205. Id. This study emphasized the impact that a change in the existing regime could
have in different market sectors. For this purpose, it did not focus only on price differentials,
"but also on product quality, product availability, after-sale services (guarantees),
employment, distribution agreements [and] market segmentation." Commission Working
Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 15. As a result, the study emphasized that
the impact of a change in the "exhaustion regime would be minimal in certain sectors like
alcoholic drinks and confectionery, whereas it may have more significant consequences in
others such as consumer electronics, domestic appliances and footwear." Id
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exhaustion regime ... is to protect [Community] competitiveness and
innovation."20 In particular, a change to international exhaustion would
reduce the value of intellectual property and put European companies
at a disadvantage against companies in countries that do not apply the
same regime. Furthermore, such a change would not necessarily lead to
a tangible change in the market because trademark owners could still
control the distribution of their goods by setting up selective distribution
networks and prohibiting sales to unauthorized dealers. This study also
listed a series of arguments favoring a change to international
exhaustion.m "Besides reducing prices... [p]arallel importation would
increase inter-brand competition, by reducing the possibility for a trade
mark holder to exploit his position in that [specific] brand and to set
higher prices in certain markets, and by increasing competition in the
distribution of the product." However, the study's overall conclusion
was still in favor of the EEA-wide exhaustion regime.m
The results of the NERA study were discussed by Member States
and interested parties in April 1999 during two meetings organized by
the Commission .2 " As expected, the Member States appeared still
divided on the issue. Some delegations expressed strong support for the
Community exhaustion regime, whereas others strongly advocated a
change to international exhaustion. 1' In particular, "certain delegations
expressed doubts about the conclusions of the [NERA] study and its
206. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 16. The
study also emphasized that Community-wide exhaustion "provides a higher economic reward
to firms that invest in the quality or style of their products, and that this incentive is necessary
in order to maintain the quality and style of products expected by consumers." Il
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id.
209. Rhys et al., supra note 202, at 19.
210. For a general overview, see Commission's web site at
http//europa.eu.int/comninternal market/en/indprop/185.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).
These consultations raised the additional question of whether a change in the trademark
exhaustion regime "could be discussed separately from the questions concerning exhaustion
of other intellectual property rights." Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion,
supra note 15, at 15. As pointed out by representatives of some Member States, "[plroducts
are in many cases protected not only by trademarks, but [also] by a multiple set of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) (copyright, patents, etc.)." Communiqu6 from Commissioner
Bolkestein on the Issue of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights, available at
http:leuropa.eu.intlcommlinternaLmarketlenlindprop/comexhaust.htm (last visited May 20,
2002) [hereinafter Communiqu6]. As reported by the Commission in the Commission
Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17, it was also held that the
introduction of international exhaustion for trademarks would therefore affect only a limited
number of sectors in a limited way.
211. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17-19.
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presumed negative effects of international exhaustion."2' 2  It was
mentioned "that the positive long-term effects of international
exhaustion should have received more attention, ' " whereas the
opponents of international exhaustion suggested that "the potential
negative impacts on consumers caused by a change of regime had been
played down."214
Consultations with interested parties also showed divergent
positions on the issue.25 Industry representatives "emphasized the
important role of trade marks and other intellectual property rights as
incentives for innovation and research."'26  They observed that
"international exhaustion would weaken the position of trade mark
proprietors and have [negative] implications for their strategic
[behavior], this in turn leading to losses in innovation, production and
employment."2' 7
In opposition, representatives of foreign associations, associations of
parallel traders, and consumer organizations underlined the benefits
that free trade could eventually provide 8  "[A]n international
exhaustion regime would lower prices, increase product availability and
increase consumption in the Community. '"1'  The opponents of
international exhaustion argued that the introduction of new
technologies (e.g., e-commerce) could give consumers access to a
greater choice of products at lower prices m  In addition, future
expansion of the Community may also have considerable impact on the
internal market by further lowering consumer prices.2 In this context,
it was emphasized that the exhaustion regime for national trademarks
and the Community trademark should be the same.' Accordingly, a
change to international exhaustion should apply to both systems.m
In December 1999, the Commission published a working document
to be discussed by the Council.2 This document examined four key
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 17-19.
215. Id at 18.
216. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 18.
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Id. at 19.
220. Id. at 17.
221. Communiqu6, supra note 208.
222. Id.
223. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 3-4.
224. See generally id.
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exhaustion related issues: (1) the possible consequences of different
regimes for national trademarks compared to Community trademarks,
(2) the distinction between exhaustion regimes and different intellectual
property rights, (3) the "differentiation of exhaustion regimes for
different sectors of industry," and (4) "international exhaustion through
international agreements. '"2'
In May 2000, the Commission concluded that a change from EEA
exhaustion would not, at least in the short term, lead to a significant fall
in consumer prices. The Commission decided not to submit any
proposal to alter the current system of exhaustion. 6 These conclusions
were based on the meetings with Member States and interested parties
and on the results highlighted in the Commission's working document.
The Commission stated that "trademark policy has only a marginal
effect on parallel trade."m This was in line with the position of trade
association representatives and was in part the result of their well
conducted lobbying activity. "[O]ther elements, like distribution
arrangements, transport costs, health and safety legislation, technical
standards and labeling differences may have a greater, and more direct
impact." m
The Commission then considered that "the exhaustion regime for
trademark would have little effect on the marketplace, given the large
majority of products that are covered by a [plurality] of intellectual
property rights."2 9 Community-wide exhaustion had been developed to
foster the integration of the internal market.2 If the Community was to
introduce international exhaustion and its trading partners did not do
likewise, Community companies, including subsidiaries and distributors
of non-Community companies, would face a competitive disadvantage." t
The debate on the issue was reignited in 2001. On February 15, the
European Community Parliament published a draft report entitled "The
Problem of the Exhaustion of Trademark Rights," once again advocating
the transition to an international exhaustion regime.22 The rationale
225. Id at 3.
226. Communiqu6, supra note 208.
227. Ia
228. Idt
229. Id
230. It
231. Communiqud, supra note 208. While refusing a change in the current regime, the
Commission did not take into account the arguments added to the debate by the High Court
of London in the Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss cases pending at that time before the ECJ.
232. See supra note 21.
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behind the request for a change in the current exhaustion regime
continued to be that the absence of international exhaustion could lead
to higher prices within the Community. The report emphasized that the
aim of trademark protection is to promote brand identity, not to allow
trademark owners to rely on the right to prevent parallel importation by
creating price differences and market barriers. In order to find a
compromise with industry representatives, this report excluded
pharmaceuticals from international exhaustion application.t m  So far,
relevant legislative amendments to the current exhaustion regime have
been neither discussed nor adopted by the Parliament.'
In April 2001, the Swedish Presidency organized an informal
seminar of internal market and consumer affairs ministers to reexamine
the issue.' Once again, this meeting showed a profound division among
the Member States.2m The only consensus reached during this seminar
was that any change to the exhaustion regime of trademark rights
should be considered according to its impact on employment, product
quality and safety, and retail prices. Because of the divergent
approaches and the lack of consensus between Member States, trade
organizations, and consumer associations, the question of whether
international trademark exhaustion should apply in Europe is likely to
continue to be at the center of discussion for a long time.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is apparently little hope left for those who favor international
exhaustion in the European Union. At least for the time being, the ECJ
233. Id.
234. Id Because of the lack of consensus, the Parliament has called on the Commission
in order to produce a study that examines (once again!) the legal and economic situation
related to trademark exhaustion within Europe and the most important trading nations.
According to the provisional edition of the Parliament's minutes, the Parliament has also
called on the Commission to
examine the legal situation with regard to the exhaustion of trademark rights in the
most important trading nations; ascertain the prospects for the conclusion of an
international agreement on harmonized rules on exhaustion of trademark rights
under the WTO or WIPO;... examine whether clarification of trademark law in
respect of non-commercial imports of goods purchased by consumers via the
Internet was needed; submit to Parliament, by 31 December 2002, a report on these
points, containing detailed proposals.
Id For a recital of the questions originally proposed by the European parliament members,
see L\Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Written Question E-0363/00 to the Commission, Nov 11,2000, O.J.
(C330 E) (2000).
235. See supra note 201.
236. Id
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has made clear that EEA-wide exhaustion is the only applicable
criterion within the internal market, and national rules providing other
exhaustion regimes are in contrast with Article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive. According to the ECJ, in order to guarantee free movement
of goods within the European market, the same exhaustion regime
should apply throughout the EEA. Interpretation of Article 7 at a
national level should not contrast with the spirit of harmonization that
characterizes the Trademark Directive. The ECJ's rulings did not
exclude the possibility for changes to the current exhaustion regime.
For the sake of harmonization and the smooth running of the internal
market, any change should occur by a general consensus among
Member States.
However, because national approaches to international exhaustion
diverge, future inconsistent case law on the issue should be expected.
Although the intervention of the ECJ clarified the interpretation of
Article 7(1) as it has been underlined, its rulings are not technically
binding for national courts. In addition, the ECJ's rulings in "Affaire
Hag" have shown that the Court can reverse itself while deciding
trademark matters. Even though its decisions have consistently been
followed by domestic tribunals, this cannot prevent possible inconsistent
judgments in the future.
There is little doubt that the building of a "fortress Europe"
represents a strategy. It is a European "defense tower" that repels the
aggressive commercial policies of other countries.2"  Ideally, trade
should be free and global. Diplomatic negotiations in the WTO
framework and the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement have proven that
such "free and global trade" is still difficult in actual practice. Because
of the lack of consensus on the issue and the economic differences
between developed and developing countries, the choice of whether or
not to apply international trademark exhaustion still remains a matter
for national legislators (Community legislators, in the case of Europe).
The ECJ and the Commission have shown how the Community is
not totally opposed to international exhaustion. This gradual process
could start on the basis of reciprocity agreements with third countries
that guarantee Member States equal treatment of their exports in the
states that are parties to agreements. However, these agreements may
represent a violation of the "most favored nation" principle as per
Article 4 of TRIPS. Because of this risk, the Community and other
interested parties have continued to choose a protective policy (i.e.,
237. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 503.
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who relabels the products informs the trademark owner of the
relabeling before the relabeled products are put on sale.' 2m
Considering the traditional antagonism of trademark owners
towards the principle of trademark exhaustion, whether national, EEA-
wide, or international, there are no doubts that they will use and
misinterpret the ECJ statements to their advantage in order to control
the further commercialization of their products in the internal market.
Once again, it should be remembered that the "specific subject matter"
and the primary function of a trademark is that of a source indicator.
Consumer protection is the primary concern. Protection of the
trademark owner is a secondary concern. It is difficult to draw the thin
line that divides "legitimate use" and "illegitimate abuse" of intellectual
property rights when confronting trademark exhaustion. However, it
should not be forgotten that any abuse of trademark protection will
entail unwelcome consequences for the marketplace sooner or later.
238. Frits Loendersloot, 1997 E.CR. at 1-6227.
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EEA-wide exhaustion) rather than adopt a liberal approach in favor of
global trade. As soon as other countries adopt international exhaustion,
the Community will probably abandon its defensive tower.
Nevertheless, considering the strong pressure from international
industries against international exhaustion, such change is not likely to
happen in the near future. Multi-national companies can rely on their
trademark rights world-wide because of several national trademark
registrations. There is little doubt that they will try to prevent, by any
means, the adoption of international exhaustion in Europe as well as in
any other countries where they conduct their business.
On the other hand, the adoption of international trademark
exhaustion world-wide will not necessarily result in the creation of the
regime with completely free and global trade that is so feared by
trademark owners. Trademark owners will be able to prevent parallel
importations of their products by placing reservations and restrictions
on their licenses and by placing labels on their product that explicitly
prohibit exportation to other countries. As the ECJ ruled, such
restrictions might fall within the scope of Article 81 of the EC Treaty as
a violation of competition law, but only under exceptional
circumstances, such as when there are important price differences
between the foreign market and the Community, a large volume of
goods exported to that market, and when trademark owners have an
oligopolistic position on the European market in the relevant goods.
Even in a regime of EEA-wide exhaustion, trademark owners may
possibly rely on their exclusive rights to prevent parallel importation of
genuine products under these circumstances. This should be seen as an
abuse of trademark protection and in conflict with the safeguards of
market competition and consumer welfare.
Finally, while international exhaustion appears to be banned from
the European Union for the time being, there should be concern for the
effectiveness of the EEA-wide exhaustion principle itself. In recent
cases about repackaged and relabeled products, the ECJ held that
trademark rights are not exhausted, "even if that constitutes a barrier to
intra-[C]ommunity trade," when an unauthorized third party has been
removing and then re-affixing or replacing labels bearing the mark that
was originally affixed to products by the trademark owner, unless "the
relabeling cannot affect the original condition of the product; the
presentation of the relabeled product is not such as to be liable to
damage the reputation of the trademark and its owner; and the person
20021
